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SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE-
THIRD GENERATION SCHOLARSHIP 
jEFFERY ATIK* & DAVID A. WIRTH** 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay introduces three outstanding pieces of Third Genera-
tion scholarship addressing the incorporation of science-based tests 
within international trade regimes. It also presents the extraordinary 
remarks of the late Bob Hudec,1 delivered on the occasion of the Sci-
ence and International Trade Conference sponsored by Boston Col-
lege and Suffolk University law schools.2 
The role of science the international trade regimes has been an 
object of scholarly attention for almost a decade.3 First Generation 
science and trade scholars questioned whether science was up to the 
task which had been put to it-resolving contentious trade disputes 
involving etl\'ironmental protection and health and safety risks. These 
writers were acutely aware of science's limits.4 Following the landmark 
EC-Honnones 5 decision by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ap-
pellate Body, a Second Generation of scholars focused on questions 
* Professor of Law and Sayre Macneil Fellow at Loyola Law School (Los Angeles). 
** Professor of Law and Director of International Programs at Boston College Law 
School. 
The authors express their gratitude to Deans John Ganey and Robert Smith, to the 
participants in the Boston College/Suffolk University Science and International Trade 
conference, and especially to Marianne Hudec for permission to print Professor Hudec's re-
marks. 
1 Professor Robert Hudec passed away on March 12, 2003. Daniel Altman, Rnbert E. 
Hudec, 68, Expert on Global Tmde Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003. At the time of his death, 
Hudec was Research Professor of International Law at the Fletcher School of Law & Di-
plomacy and Professor Emeritus of Law at the Uni\'ersity of Minnesota Law School. 
2 The Boston College/Suffolk Uni\'ersity Conference-Science and International Trade-
was held in Boston on October 20, 2000. Da\'id Wirth and Jeffery Atik organized the Con-
ference. 
3 See DaYid Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and N.1FTA Trade Disciplines, 
27 CoRNELL lwr'L LJ. 817 (1994). 
4 Wirth, supra note 3; Vern Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a Taxonomy of Sci-
entific UnccrtaintyforDecisionmakers, 23 CoNN. L. REV. 567 (1991). 
5 \\'TO Appellate Body Report on European Community Measures Concerning Meat 
and r.teat Products, \\'T /DS26/ AB/R; V\'T /DS48/ AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 
1998). 
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presented by the decisional law-the textual and structural limits of 
the "science-based" disciplines found in the international trade re-
gime.6 
A Third Generation of work is now blossoming. New (and old) 
writers are returning to first principles, on the one hand, and are 
looking beyond the confines of specific regimes, on the other. Vern 
Walker, for example, carefully dissects risk assessment, the supposedly 
neutral and central requirement of the WTO's sanitary and phyto-
sanitary (SPS) regime, and finds it riddled with hidden political (i.e. 
non-scientific) decision points.7 Todd Weiler and Olivette Rivera-
Tones reach out beyond the WTO to active and emerging sites for 
international contest where science will likely play a role: Weiler to 
North American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) investor/state 
dispute resolution mechanism8 and Rivera-Torres to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety.9 
As international trade regimes grow stronger, their ability to 
check and challenge national legislation increases. National stan-
dards-which may be uncontroversial on their face when examined 
solely from the national perspective-become problematic when they 
fail to match up with standards applied by trading partners. The fact 
of inconsistent standards operates to create non-tariff barriers. 
First in regional settings, such as the European Union (EU), and 
more recently in the global trading regime, powerful norms have 
been introduced to coerce nations to suspend the application of their 
respective national standards to imported goods. The imperatives of 
free trade are to sweep away inconsistent national standards. Har-
monization and global standards are the international means of 
eliminating conflicts between standards; equivalency and mutual rec-
ognition are national tools (at times mandated by regional or interna-
tional authorities) used to reduce regulatory conflict. 
Reducing regulatory freedom-of-action strikes the heart of na-
tional political autonomy-sovereignty, if you will. This is particularly 
so in areas such as environmental and food safety regulation, where 
6 See Vern Walker, Keeping the \-ITO from Becoming the 'World Trans-science Organization': 
Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CoR-
NELL INT'L LJ. 251 (1998). 
7 Vern Walker, The Myth of Science as a "Neutral Arbiter" for Trigge1ing Precautions, 26 B.C. 
lNT'L & COMP. L. REV. 197 (2003). 
8 Todd Weiler, The Treatment of SPS Measures Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Preliminary .-\n-
swers to an Open-Ended Question, 26 B.C. lNT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 229 (2003). 
9 Olivette Rivera-Torres, The Biosafety Protocol and the \-ITO, 26 B.C. lNT'L & CoMP. L. 
REV. 263 (2003). 
2003] Science & International Trade 173 
the people have long-standing and legitimate expectations of protec-
tion by their governments. 10 Architects of the new trade regimes-
NAFTA and the WTO-seized on science to clearly divide the 
legitimate from the protectionist. Measures protective of public 
health, or worker safety, or the environment, are to be considered 
legitimate (and insulated from a trade-based attack) if they have a 
scientific basis. The corollary is that measures lacking a scientific basis 
are unmasked as likely having a protectionist motive and effect. 
Science was to be the neutral and authoritative arbiter of this divide. 
At the time of the Uruguay Round, the U.S./EU hormones dis-
pute concentrated the minds of the negotiators. Indeed the postures 
of the two disputants were erected on scientific (or non-scientific) 
grounds-the presence (or absence) of risk of harm to humans con-
suming hormone-treated beef. The hormones dispute prompted the 
new SPS accordsll-and placed scientific determinations at the heart 
of the international trade dispute settlement. 
I. SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE SCHOLARSHIP-
THE EARLy GENERATIONS 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round marked a significant 
movement towards the use of "scientific" determinations to scrutinize 
national legislation, especially in the area of health laws (known as 
"sanitary and phytosanitary [SPS] measures" in vVTO-speak). The 
vVTO's SPS Agreements introduced new principles, including the re-
quirements of a scientific basis for SPS measures and of the conduct 
of a risk assessment. 
A group of international trade scholars with knowledge of (or at 
least deep appreciation for) the scientific enterprise immediately rec-
ognized that resolving trade disputes by "science" raised a host of 
troubling issues. These writers comprised a First Generation working 
on the problematical use of science in international trade. We have 
10 Sec generally Jeffery Atik, Identifying Antidemocratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice 
and International Trade, 19 U. PA.j. INT'L EcoN. L. 229 (1998). 
11 The Uruguay Round agreements included a special agreement on SPS measures-
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF TIH. URUGUAY RoUND Yo!. 31 (1994). 
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had the privilege of being both participants in, and contributors to, 
this debate for some time.I2 
The 1998 decision of the Appellate Body in EC-Honnones 
launched a Second Generation of science and international trade 
scholarship. With EC-Honnones, and the two succeeding WTO Appel-
late Body decisions on SPS matters-Australia-Salmon13 and japan-
Varietals14-scholars could focus on specific strengths and weaknesses 
of the new regime. Second Generation scholarship is decidedly less 
abstract, but perhaps more revealing, than the earlier, speculative 
work.'5 A recent interdisciplinary conference at the University of 
Michigan16 exemplified the Second Generation approach.'7 
Motivated primarily by our own attraction to and respect for the 
subject matter, we decided to put together a meeting in Boston on 
what we thought was a rather esoteric issue. The resulting conference, 
entitled Science and International Trade, was held on October 20, 2000. 
The response, particularly among potential presenters, was far more 
gratifYing that we could have anticipated. Contributors ranged across 
a broad cross section of the governmental, academic, and non-profit 
sectors from North America and Europe. Speakers included: 
Nicholas Ashford of MIT's Technology and Law Program 
Francesca Bignami of Duke Law School 
Laura Campbell of Environmental Law International 
12 Wirth, supra note 3; David Wirth, International Decisions. European Communities-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 755 (1988); Jeffery Atik, 
Science and International Regulatory Convergence, 17 N.W. J. lNT'L L. & Bus. 736 ( 1996-97). 
13 WfO Appellate Body Report on Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon, Wf/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20,1998) (adopted Nov. 6, 1998). 
14 WfO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, 
Wf /DS76/ AB/R (Feb 22, 1999) (adopted Mar. 19, 1999). 
15 For excellent examples, see Steve Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety 
Regulation lry World Trade Rules, 13 TuL. ENvTL. LJ. 271 (2000); Joost Pauwelyn, The 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in the First Three SPS Dis-
putes, 2 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 641 (1999); and David Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five }ears, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 
& PoL. 865 (2000). 
16 The University of Michigan Health, Trade & Ecology Workshop-Risk Assessment in 
the Context of Trade Disputes: How Well Are Scientific Principles Incorporated into the Resolution of 
Science-Based Trade Disputes7---was held in Ann Arbor on November 1 & 2, 2001. The Michi-
gan workshop was organized by Prof. Sioban Harlow. 
17 Lawyers and public health scholars were matched to examine issues raised by the 
three initial WfO SPS cases. Scholarship resulting from the Michigan workshop includes 
Joost Pauwelyn, The Use of Experts in Dispute Settlement, 51 Iwr'L & CoMP. L.Q. 325 
(2002); and Jeffery Atik, The Weakest Link-Demonstrating the Inconsistency of "A.ppropriate 
Levels of Protection" in Australia-Salmon, RisK ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2003 ) . 
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Paul Epstein of Harvard Medical School 
John Garvey of Boston College Law School 
John Graham, then affiliated with the Harvard School of 
Public Health 
Patricia Hansen of The University of Texas School of Law 
Linda Horton of the Food and Drug Administration 
Robert Hudec of the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy 
Janet Martinez of the Consensus Building Institute 
Kilaparti Ramakrishna ofthe Woods Hole Research Center 
Nicolas de Sadeleer of CEDE-Brussels 
Joel Tickner of the University of Massachusetts-Lowell 
Vern Walker of Hofstra University School of Law 
Todd Weiler, then affiliated with the Fletcher School of Law 
& Diplomacy. 
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In organizing this conference, we hoped to stimulate a third wave 
of scholarship in this field. We also took the liberty of sitting back-
delighting in the creative and insightful work that was presented us. 
\Ve do, of course, have more to say on these matters and look forward 
to participating further in this Third Generation we mark with this 
essay. 
II. THREE PIECES oF THIRD GENERATION ScHOLARSHIP 
There remain at this writing but three cases decided under the 
vVTO SPS Agreement, and together with these there is an additional 
case-EC-Asbestos 18-tl1at displays the WTO's new-found respect for 
science-based argument in resolving a trade dispute.'9 This relative 
decisional quiet-and the emergence of new scholars focusing on the 
SPS regime-has permitted a return to a deeper examination of the 
problematics of the use of science in international trade law. 20 Robert 
Howse's testing of science and democratic values is an outstanding 
example of Third Generation scholarship.21 
18 \'\TO Appellate Body Report on European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbes-
tos and Asbestos-containing Products, \-\T /DS135/ AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1193 
(2001) (adopted Apr. 5, 2001). 
19 See DaYid Wirth, International Decisions, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbes-
tos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 96 AM.J. INT'I" L. 435 (2002). 
20 See Theofanis Christoforou, Settlement of Science-Based Trade Disputes in the WTO: A 
Critical Review of Developing Case Law in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 
622 (2000); Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the Pre-
cautionary P1inciple, 40 CoLUM . .J. ThANSNAT'L L. 323 (2002). 
21 Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the W01id 
Trade Organization, 98 l\fiCII. L. REv. 2329 (2000). 
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This symposium issue of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review presents three fresh-and exciting-examples of 
Third Generation science and international trade scholarship. Pre-
liminary versions of two of these papers, those by Walker and by 
Weiler, were originally presented at the October 2000 conference-al-
though it must be remarked that their authors have carried their 
respective themes far forward in the passing two years. 
Vern Walker presents here a devastating disassembly of the 
identification and finding of risk. The elemental notion of risk is ex-
tremely problematic and explicitly political-hardly the neutral or 
technocratic refuge imagined by trade negotiators. The drafters of the 
WTO SPS Agreement understood that science would not be a com-
plete source for dictating regulatory standards; nations would inevita-
bly make political judgments. The design of the SPS Agreement was 
to pull scientific and political decisions apart-permitting each to be 
scrutinized with respect to its own values. Thus, the SPS Agreement 
mandates risk assessment, which is seen as a neutral, technocratic en-
terprise where science can be useful. Only measures based on risk as-
sessment pass SPS muster. The requirement of risk assessment is both 
procedural and substantive. Nations are expected to conduct risk as-
sessments-measures imposed without an adequate risk assessment 
process are capable of challenge. Further, there must be a rational 
relationship between the risk assessed and the measure imposed-this 
is the requirement of a scientific foundation (means/ends) as a mat-
ter of substance. 
The division between the technocratic and the political is often 
described as one between risk assessment and risk management. The 
WTO SPS Agreement makes clear that political decisions (how much 
risk to tolerate) are sovereign decisions-generally immune from 
WTO attack. 
Vern Walker's piece demonstrates that political choices permeate 
the risk assessment process as well. He marshals a host of problems 
attendant to risk assessment that are ignored or underconsidered. A 
simple notion-such as "risk of harm" -is so filled with preconcep-
tions about causality, responsibility and the normal course of things as 
to be hardly neutral. We introduce error when we define the problem 
to redress. We are insensitive to measurement error-and the prob-
lem of learned behavior. We unknowingly commit sampling errors-
and thus reach erroneous conclusions. Our models are primitive and 
oversimplified and we often cannot distinguish association from 
cause. The cumulative effect of these uncertainties-and what as a 
matter of choice we decide to ignore-undermine any confidence 
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that we can flee from the political in deciding whether a measure 
should stand. 
Walker develops the notion of a "risk trigger"-a complex 
finding about the presence of a risk of harm that indicates that a 
regulatory response is appropriate. Walker examines triggers drawn 
from U.S., EU and vVTO law. The setting of a risk trigger is pointedly 
nonscientific-the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's triggers-
whether a substance is "poisonous or deleterious" or "injurious to 
health"-are not simple scientific determinations. The setting of 
thresholds of risk, where regulation is mandated, is a political judg-
ment, not a scientific one. 
Todd Weiler asks how the newly developed science-based tests 
might be used in a NAFTA investment dispute. He notes that none of 
the rendered NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal decisions has depended on 
a scientific determination. Yet Chapter 11, in different and at times 
oblique ways, investigates similar questions to those posed within the 
trade-in-goods regimes: is a particular regulatory action effected for a 
valid purpose or for a prohibited one? In trade law, the prohibited 
motive is protectionism. The corresponding notions in NAFTA in-
vestment law would be discrimination,22 less than minimum standard 
of treatment,23 or compensable expropriation.24 Can science tell us 
whether a regulatory program constitutes a "measure tantamount to 
an expropriation"? Or whether it is arbitrary, and thus fails to accord 
a minimum standard of treatment? Weiler argues the science-based 
tests are available to Chapter 11 tribunals and are appropriate. 
Weiler sees great potential utility in the science-based discipline 
for resolving Chapter 11 disputes. A Chapter 11 tribunal could use-
fully borrow the SPS tests to check a challenged investment measure 
for certainty, transparency, and a rational means-end relationship. 
The science-based tests will not by themselves establish that a measure 
passes the "minimum standard of treatment" demanded by NAFTA 
Article 1105 ( 1). The absence of a scientific basis, or even of risk analy-
sis, would be suggestive, however, of deficient treatment. Weiler, in 
some sense, treats compliance by the NAFTA Party with the SPS disci-
22 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1102, 
1103, 1104, 107 Stat. 2057 (1994), 32I.L.M. 605 (1993). 
23 !d. art. 1105(1). 
24 !d. art. Ill 0 (1). 
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plines as an actionable expectancy of NAFTA investors under Chapter 
11,25 
Weiler also pays attention to expropriation scenarios-both the 
Ethyl and Methanex cases arguably depended on the quality of the sci-
ence behind the particular regulatory action that was asserted to ef-
fect a taking of the NAFTA investor's business. Weiler suggests that 
regulation should not be deemed confiscatory if there is a scientific 
basis for it. His assertion is quite bold-it is one thing to argue that a 
scientific basis can provide support for the "public purpose" prong of 
NAFTA Article lllO(l)(a) (a necessary predicate for a NAFTA-
consistent taking); it is quite another to argue that regulation that 
meets a scientific test should not be considered a taking at all! 
Since the first General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) 
Tuna-Dolphin report in 1991,26 there has been great interest in the 
global trade regime's approach to multilateral environmental agree-
ments (MEAs) employing trade measures. This issue has been 
sufficiently persistent and has now earned its own acronym, the "MEA 
Problem." Part of the concern has been practical, in that a number of 
important, near-universal agreements on protection of the strato-
spheric ozone layer, shipment of toxic wastes, and endangered spe-
cies, employ trade restrictions in the service of environmental protec-
tion. A large part of the fascination continues to derive, as well, from 
the absence of any concrete disputes in which trade measures author-
ized by an MEA in fact have been challenged, leading to much spectt-
lation as to the outcome of such a hypothetical case. 
When the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted in 2000,27 
that agreement immediately took its place alongside the other MEAs 
that might be targeted by the WTO's trade disciplines. From an ana-
lytical point of view, however, this new agreement was different from 
the others. Unlike multilateral environmental agreements concluded 
earlier, the Biosafety Protocol was emblematic of a new generation of 
instruments negotiated against a backdrop of heightened attention to 
the potential for tension or outright conflict with international obli-
25 Were Weiler's vision to come to pass, it would be an example of "post-
discriminatory" international trade law decried by Hudec in his keynote remarks pre-
sented herein. Robert Hudec, Science and "Post-Discriminatory" WTO Law, 26 B.C. Iwr'L & 
CoMP. L. REv. 185 (2003). 
26 WTO Dispute Settlement Body Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155 (1991) (circulated but never adopted). 
27 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 
2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027. 
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gations governing trade. While that situation might have been ex-
pected to produce greater clarity, the result was the reverse. The final 
text of the Biosafety Protocol, mirroring the underlying competing 
policy considerations, contains potentially contradictory language al-
ternately suggesting that trade disciplines, or the environmental obli-
gations in the instrument, ought to prevail over the other. 
Olivette Rivera-Torres's article is probably the most thoughtful, 
detailed, and logical analysis yet of this situation. She commences with 
the proposition that a conflict between the Protocol and GATT /WTO 
rules ought not to be presumed, surely the most rational starting 
place for considering two agreements that are both potentially global 
in scope. She then proceeds objectively to dissect the possible scenar-
ios under both the Protocol and the trade disciplines. Her conclusion 
that the likelihood of a conflict is low intuitively seems right, but an 
exhaustive, and, in our view, ultimately convincing, analysis like this 
has so far been lacking in the literature. 
III. REMARKs AT THE BosTON CoLLEGE/SuFFOLK CoNFERENCE: 
GARVEY AND HUDEC 
Boston College Law School's John Garvey was one of the two 
"host deans" at the October 2000 conference.28 In his welcoming talk, 
Dean Garvey identified analogous debates present in U.S. constitu-
tional law. Garvey's remarks-which are presented in this volume29_ 
were echoed many times during the ensuing discussion and were ex-
plicitly invoked in Bob Hudec's keynote address. 
The participants and audience at the Boston College/Suffolk 
conference had the pleasure of hearing a keynote presentation by 
Professor Robert Hudec, surely one of the preeminent thinkers of the 
day on trade law and policy. As this volume was reaching the final 
stages of preparation, Professor Hudec sadly passed away. While the 
reach of his intellect was truly global, we, in the Boston area, feel his 
loss particularly keenly. Bob, in the brief years following his retire-
ment from the University of Minnesota Law School, was a fixture on 
international trade debates, making his professional home at yet a 
third Boston institution of higher learning, the Fletcher School of 
Law & Diplomacy. Indeed, were it not for his untimely death, we 
28 Suffolk UniYersity law dean Robert Smith was the other "host dean." 
29 John Gan·ey, Science and International Trade, 26 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 183 
(2003). 
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would have invited Bob to contribute introductory remarks for this 
volume. 
Bob had a way of cutting to the heart of a problem while simulta-
neously viewing it afresh. He was a man of ideas, with an insatiable 
thirst for new learning. One of us was once abruptly summoned to 
Fletcher to respond to Bob's discovery of the precautionary principle, 
an emerging international good practice standard addressed by all 
three of the articles which follow. After an introductory presentation 
followed by a rigorous cross examination, Bob proceeded in a single 
syllable to label the precautionary principle mere "fog." 
We are indeed fortunate to have a tape and transcript, which pre-
serve Bob's remarks at the October 2000 event. Somewhat to our sur-
prise, Bob displayed a healthy skepticism concerning the WfO 
Agreement on the Application of SPS Measures. Bob was never one to 
accept received wisdom at face value, and this occasion was no excep-
tion. He expressed a particular concern for overreaching on the part 
of trade-based disciplines. In explaining why, he coined a new term, 
"post-discrimination." 
Bob drew a strong contrast between the SPS Agreement's science-
based disciplines and more traditional tests of non-discrimination in 
the GATI and WfO agreements, which he considered to have been 
entirely successful in distinguishing between acceptable and abusive 
measures. Along the way, he left us with enduring insights into the 
real-world aspects of dispute settlement in trade agreements, capped 
by a memorable olfactory metaphor. 
Bob's opening address established a tone of serious, purposeful 
inquiry for the rest of the day, for which he remained until its conclu-
sion at a late hour. While we will miss his undoubtedly trenchant ob-
servations on problems of science in trade agreements yet to come, 
we are indeed fortunate to have had the benefit of his perceptive in-
sights both on that day at Suffolk and on numerous other occasions. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholarship on the role of science in trade agreements, as indi-
cated by the pieces in the present volume, may now have matured to 
the point that three distinct generations of thinking can be identified. 
The issues are sufficiently complex, and the difficulties of communi-
cation among the disciplines involved so profound, that it seems 
difficult to imagine that there could ever be a final word on this ab-
sorbing subject. The present volume, like the Boston College/Suffolk 
conference it follows, is motivated by the more modest, but nonethe-
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less hopeful, aspiration of incrementally expanding our collective ho-
rizons. It is dedicated to catalyzing yet another generation of thinking 
on this most fascinating of topics. 
Our work in this area continues.3° We celebrate the expansion of 
the community of scholars, including non-lawyers, who are exploring 
these themes. We find ourselves renewed and inspired by this new 
work-and look forward to continuing our participation in this dis-
course. 
!10 The road to an academic's hell is paved with good intentions of future projects. 
That said, David Wirth and Jeffery Atik are at work on a jointly-authored book on Science 
and International Trade. 
